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CONFERENCE ON TWO-SIDED MARKETS,
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 2005
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON TWO-SIDED MARKETS
AND PRICING
We want to join Bob Pitofsky in thanking the participants
in this symposium for their thoughtful contributions. The
literature on two-sided markets, both analytical and policy
oriented, has mushroomed and this timely set of essays
represents a significant contribution. The first generation of
this literature grew up around the credit card industry,
largely as a result of the antitrust litigation that challenged
a wide range of standard practices in that industry.
However, the theoretical problems that were first uncovered
in this context extend to many other activities as well. The
full range of papers found in this symposium, which have
become part of an ever larger corpus of writings, may
suggest the somewhat facile conclusion that all markets
involving three or more players are really two-sided. But
any effort to so extend the concept has the unfortunate
consequence of trivializing it and of confusing two-sided
markets with complex distribution chains that involve
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and the
like.
As broad as the two-sided market concept is, the papers
in this symposium have tended to look to three markers of
two-sided markets: network externalities; interchange fees;
and differential pricing to each side of the market. Despite
their prominence in the literature, interchange fees are not a
necessary feature of a two-sided market. When observed,
these fees are merely a result of the non-integrated structure
utilized by Visa and Mastercard, which requires an
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additional transaction between the acquiring bank1 and the
issuing bank2 that is unnecessary in integrated card systems.
The network externalities feature is simple enough-
merchants will not have much incentive to honor credit cards
if there are no users, and users will not have much incentive
to carry credit cards if there are few merchants who honor
them. Every user of a telephone understands this basic
principle.
The pricing point is trickier and we want to add a few
words on this vexed and controverted subject. To attract
enough users, a card company (or a card system) might need
to lure them in with favorable terms that do not cover the
transaction costs arising on that side of the market. To
make up for these potential losses, the card system would
necessarily charge a higher price to at least some of the
merchants on the other side of the market. But in this game,
all merchants need not be created equal. Indeed, in a real
world setting, it is likely that some merchants will prove so
valuable that a card company is willing to pay them to honor
its card, much like a shopping mall will charge a low,
perhaps even negative, rent to an anchor tenant.
Competition between card networks on both sides of the
market should bid away most of the economic rents, but,
given these powerful interdependencies, it is likely that the
prices charged to participants on either side of the market
will not match the costs incurred on that side of the market.
If merchants are, as most commentators suggest,
"subsidizing" users by paying an interchange fee, then that is
a cost of doing business that they must cover in the long run.
And, if that is so, then consumers as a class ultimately will
pay. Determining which price consumers will pay is of
course a difficult analysis. If all consumers used credit cards
in the same proportion, then any distributional and incentive
questions would have relatively straightforward answers.
1 The acquiring bank transacts with merchants that accept credit
cards.
2 The issuing bank transacts with customers that utilize its credit
cards.
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But the heterogeneity among consumers could easily create a
situation in which some consumers benefit more than others
and, perhaps, some are hurt because they do not use credit
cards much or at all.
The overall effect of these multiple shifts is uncertain,
but, on balance, we suspect that the net effect is that
consumers as a group are better off with this system. This is
true because if credit cards expand the overall market for a
merchant's goods, then even cash payers will pay less than
they would if credit cards were not in circulation. We might
well be wrong about this point, but even if we are, it seems
clear that the efficiency of the system as a whole has little to
do with the initial incidence of the costs (i.e., with who is
said to subsidize whom). The first-order effect is that the
total amount charged to both sides of the market must cover
the total costs generated by both sides. The distribution of
these costs in an unregulated market is at best a second-
order effect, and one that we suspect has little bearing on the
long-term efficiency of the system.
A significant, but often overlooked, concern of economic
analysis is figuring out how to compensate various market
participants for providing a service or product that benefits
two or more groups simultaneously. For example, television,
newspapers, magazines, and internet providers put together
various mixes of advertising, entry, and per unit fees.
Determining which combination of fees and programs would
be best for a particular firm is an economizing problem that,
at bottom, is no different in principle than determining its
appropriate mix of inputs. Is Apple's iTunes music retailing
business model (99¢ per song) better than the newly
emerging competitive arrangement-a flat monthly fee for
unlimited rentals? That is like asking whether phone
companies should remove all monthly fees and rely
exclusively on user charges or vice versa. We do not know
the answers to questions of this sort any more than we know
the optimal ratio of steel to aluminum for building a car. It
is precisely because policymakers do not know, and cannot
learn, the answers to these questions that they should let the
marketplace sort them out.
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Consider the problem faced by brokers determining how
to price their services. Brokers, of course, are in a two-sided
market and have three basic pricing mechanisms available
to them: commission pricing; fixed fees; and cost-based rates
that reflect their actual time and expenses. All three have
familiar warts that do not discolor with age. Commission
pricing encourages the buyer's broker to limit his search for
low prices and to induce the customer to take a package that
is more elaborate (expensive) than a completely faithful
agent would have assembled. The seller's broker has an
incentive to get the customer to sell too soon or at too low a
price. On either side of the market, a broker receiving a
fixed fee has an incentive to shirk once this fee has been
determined; his incentive to search for the best price, be it
high or low, is as attenuated as his incentive to spend time
putting together a package that matches the client's needs.
A cost-based system (e.g., hourly billing) encourages the
broker to incur costs, perhaps by lax time management. Yet,
despite their imperfections, all three forms are in common
use, sometimes alone and sometimes in combination. They
are not perfect, but we know that all three can work because
they have worked, albeit in different circumstances.
Moreover, a number of factors mitigate their perverse
incentives, most notably reputational concerns and the
awareness of most brokers that their best sources of new
clients are satisfied old clients. Word of mouth is widely
regarded as the most effective form of education.
The two-sided nature of this particular market might also
help to overcome the mismatch of incentives in this agency
cost situation, and these solutions might have more general
implications. The buyer's broker, for example, need not rely
solely on his own clients for compensation; he could solicit
contingent payments from sellers as well. The more
compensation that the buyer's brokers receive from sellers,
the less they will require from buyers, other things being
equal. As noted above in the discussion of interchange fees,
if brokers receive more from sellers, competition suggests
that they will receive less from buyers. The form of the
contingent compensation might induce the broker to favor
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certain sellers. At the same time, the perverse incentives
inherent in the pricing arrangements with customers are
vitiated. A broker might be more tempted to goldplate a
package if he is receiving a 15% commission than if he is
receiving a 10% commission. On net, are the customers as a
group better off if contingent payments are banned? That is
a hard question, and it cannot be resolved merely by
invoking monopoly or conflict of interest theory.
These few simple examples demonstrate, in our view, that
the analytical framework for evaluating complex pricing
structures is underdeveloped. This fact has not prevented
policymakers from jumping in to regulate two-sided markets.
As we write this brief introduction, there are rumors that the
Justice Department is considering an antitrust action
against residential realtors for their enforcement of fixed
commissions. And a few months ago, the Attorney General
for the State of New York forced commercial insurance
brokers to drop their policy of obtaining contingent fees from
insurers, a practice derided by some as "kickbacks." But this
tough rhetoric may signal more indignation than
understanding. Over thirty years ago, Ronald Coase
observed that "if an economist finds something-a business
practice of one sort or other-that he does not understand,
he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we
are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices
tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly
explanation frequent."3 Bob Dylan made the same point
more succinctly: "don't criticize what you can't understand."4
We do not intend to claim that the full range of such
practices is necessarily benign, but merely that, with our
limited understanding of the operation of two-sided markets,
we are not yet equipped to judge them.
3 RONALD H: COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 67 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1988) (published earlier as Industrial Organization: A
Proposal for Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 59-73 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., National Bureau
of Economic Research 1972).
' BOB DYLAN, The Times They are A-Changin', on THE TIMES THEY ARE
A-CHANGIN' (Legacy Recordings 1964).
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